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SQUATTERS AND THE LAW: THE RELEVANCE OF THE
UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE TO CURRENT PROBLEMS
IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
KENNETH A. MANASTER*
INTRODUCTION
The recent, massive growth of the cities of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America has brought a multitude of new problems to these
areas. One of the most critical, and hitherto unheard of, problems
is the problem of the urban squatters. Literally millions of persons
now reside within major cities without having any lawful right
to be on the land they occupy. The problem these persons present
is complex and serious: How and when are these countries going
to be able to offer their masses of urban dwellers the opportunity
and the resources to legally acquire the housing they need?
In order that it may be clear what is meant here by "squatter,"
the following definition is offered as an attempt to describe the
principal elements of the most critical situations usually con-
sidered: squatters are persons who occupy land owned by other
persons or institutions with the intention of doing so indefinitely
and with the knowledge that they do not own the land but without
the consent of these owners to indefinite occupancy and use. In
short, squatters are illegal settlers on land who intend to stay
indefinitely.
This definition is presented at the outset because a comparison
will be made here between two historical types of squatter situa-
tions which on the surface appear quite different. The comparison
is between squatters in the United States throughout its history
and squatters in today's developing nations. The definition above
attempts to emphasize those features which, from a legal point of
view, are quite similar in both types of situations. Although squat-
ters on the vast, open lands of the United States may seem to
present different problems from those presented by the masses of
squatters now packing themselves into major cities of Africa,
Asia, and Latin America, from a legal standpoint there is but one
problem and one challenge underlying the main features of both
types of situations. The challenge is for the law to serve society's
needs by facilitating the fairest and most beneficial use of land
rather than impeding it. The squatter situations which were most
critical in the United States and those which are so explosive
in the modern world are not isolated instances of cantankerous or
* LL.B. Harvard; Fulbright Grantee, University of San Marcos, Peru;
Member, Illinois Bar.
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lawless individuals taking it into their minds to hold by force
some other fellows' land where the grass looks greener. They are,
instead, social movements of great magnitude. In the United States
squatting was primarily the result of an immigrant population
moving west to make homes in a vast nation. In the cities of the
poor nations of today, squatting is the result of unparalleled pop-
ulation growth and of the rush from the economically stricken
countrysides to the cities with their promise, or dream, of a better
life. The legitimate needs of large groups of people, then, are the
foundations of squatting movements. The challenge is for the law
to strike a just balance between those needs and the interests of
legitimate land owners under the prevailing legal standards.
Squatters, as we have defined them, are engaged in activity
which is clearly contrary to the prevailing legal standards of
conduct and delineation of rights; when this activity is on a large
scale, it is necessary for the peace and stability of a nation that
this defiance of law either be brought to a halt or that the law be
so implemented and adapted as to satisfy the needs underlying
the squatting. It should be clear from a description of both the
United States experience and the current world problems that the
law has shown itself incapable of simply stopping wide-spread
squatting. If serious social changes are in fact at the roots of
squatting, then a failure to adapt legal concepts and methods to
meet these new changes and needs-to strike the just balance
and help men make the best use of land-will simply mean that the
law is not serving as an effective vehicle for either social order or
social progress, nor for the balancing of the two.
The history of squatters in the United States includes the insti-
tution of a number of legal measures which can be seen as attempts
to fashion the law to meet the changing conditions and desires of
the people. The question we shall try first to answer here is: To
what extent and in what ways can the United States experience
with legal measures for dealing with squatting help in the identi-
fication and implementation of measures to solve squatter problems
in the developing nations of the modern world? The inquiry will
have four Sections: First, a brief description of current squatter
problems in the developing nations. Second, a description of squat-
ting as it has been known in the United States. Third, an explana-
tion and evaluation of the legal means employed by state legislatures
and courts in this country for dealing with squatter settlements.
This Section will focus mainly upon the doctrine of adverse pos-
session-its purposes, its effectiveness, and its possible utility in
confronting modern squatter problems. Fourth, the principal mea-
sures adopted by the national government of the United States for
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dealing with squatters on public lands. The Preemption and Home-
stead Acts will be the main objects of this examination, with par-
ticular reference to their possible ability to clarify the rights of
existing squatters and to anticipate and regulate likely future
squatting.
URBAN SQUATTERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
As an indication of the tremendous numbers of urban squat-
ters in the developing countries, the following are recent estimates
of the percentages of squatters in the populations of various cities:
45%of Ankara, Turkey; 21% of Istanbul, Turkey; 33%of Karachi,
Pakistan; 20% of Manila, Philippines; 35% of Caracas, Venezuela;
50% of Maracaibo, Venezuela; 30%of Cali, Colombia; 25% of
Santiago, Chile.1 One estimate places Singapore's squatters at
130,000, and Hong Kong reportedly had as many as 300,000 by
1950.2 Current estimates place the number of city squatters in
Peru at about 750,000 or more, mostly in the area of the capital,
Lima, but also in Arequipa and a number of other smaller Peruvian
cities.3 Indicative of the rapid urban growth and squatter influx
in Peru is the fact that the number of squatter residents in the
Lima area in 1958 was estimated at 130,000,4 in 1962 at 338,000,1
and in 1966 at 500,000.6 The total population of Lima at present
is something over two million persons; squatters thus account for
about 25 % of Lima's population. This percentage is the result of the
tremendous growth of Lima which started just before World
War II. As of 1942 Lima's population was about 521,0007 and its
squatters certainly were no more than four or five thousand.
There is a small but growing quantity of research being done
1 C. Abrams, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World 13 (1964)[hereinafter cited as Abrams, Man's Struggle].
2 Id. at 22.
8 This figure is given mainly on the basis of estimates by John F. C.
Turner. His extensive research in Peru has indicated that squatters account
for 25-30% of the population of Lima and 35-45% of those provincial towns
which are undergoing rapid urbanization. This places Lima's squatters at
about 500,000, and other other cities' at upwards of 250,000. See also H. Dietz,
Uncontrolled Urban Development in Lima: A Brief History and Evaluation 3(Unpublished graduate student research paper, University of Indiana, 1967);
Turner, Environmental Security and Housing Input, 9 Carnegie Review 13
(1966); J. Turner, Colonizaci6n Urbana No Regulada: Problemas Que Crea y
Criterios Pfiblicos al Respecto 72. An official study estimated in 1962 a total
of 528,905 squatters nationally, of which more than 180,000 were outside the
Lima area. Corporaci6r Nacional de La Vivienda, Informaci6n Bisica Sobre
Barrios Marginales en La Repfiblica del Perfi 213.
4 A. Cordova V., La Vivienda En El Perdi: Estado Actual y Evaluaci6n
de ]as Necesidades 76.
5 Corporaci6n Nacional de La Vivienda, supra note 3, at 213.
0 Turner, supra note 3.
7 Violich, Cities of Latin America 224 (1944).
[Vol. XLIII
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on the subject of urban squatters. What it has indicated is that
population growth and increased migration from rural to urban
areas in the developing countries have far surpassed available
urban housing facilities for middle and low income persons.8 The
result has been that on vacant lands in the central areas and on
the outskirts of major cities a variety of types of squatter colonies
have developed. For the most part the living conditions are crowded
and unsanitary; there is little or no attention to, or attempts at en-
forcement of, whatever building, health, and safety regulations
may exist. In some areas, however, the dwellings are fairly clean
and well-equipped, even if their construction is not sturdy. And
in some instances, even substantial, sturdy homes and stores of
concrete and similar materials have been built. Such instances
point up the fact that lack of available low-income housing-rather
than poverty alone-is probably the immediate cause of most
squatting.9
One particularly interesting feature of squatter settlements is
that the extent to which squatters improve their dwellings and
make them more permanent seems to be a function of the degree of
security which the squatters feel they have in their present loca-
tions.10 If eviction appears possible at any moment, a well-built and
stable community is unlikely. This fact helps to suggest an approach
to the solution of the many problems facing squatters and the urban
areas in which they live. If the factor of security in the right to use
land has a great bearing on the use which will be made of it, then it
would seem that policies for the alleviation of squatter problems
might usefully concentrate, as a first major step, upon measures for
clarifying and stabilizing the legal rights of the squatters.1 By
8 See generally Abrams, Man's Struggle; C. Abrams, Squatter Settle-
ments: The Problem and the Opportunity (1965) (Unpublished, preliminary
draft in mimeograph form of a paper for the Office of International Housing,
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development) [hereinafter cited
as Abrams, Squatter Settlements]; Haar, Latin America's Troubled Cities,
41 Foreign Affairs 536 (1963); J. Turner, Uncontrolled Urban Development
and the Resettlement of Squatters (1965) (Unpublished, first draft in mimeo-
graph form of a preliminary report on housing and planning standards for
the Bureau of Social Affairs, United Nations) [hereinafter cited as Turner,
Uncontrolled Urban Development]; J. Turner, Unpublished Lecture Given by
J. Turner at Universities of Oregon, California (Berkeley) and Southern
California (1965); P. Nehemkis, Latin America: Myth and Reality 183-92
(1966); W. Mangin, Squatter Settlements, 217 Scientific American No. 4,
p. 21 (October 1967). Turner's comprehensive study of the urban squatter
problem and related aspects of uncontrolled urban growth will soon be pub-
lished by the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center for Urban Affairs. See also
Manaster, The Problem of Urban Squatters in Developing Countries: Peru,
1968 Wis. L. Rev. 23.
9 See, e.g., Abrams, Man's Struggle 14, 16, 18.
10 Abrams, Man's Struggle 16; Abrams, Squatter Settlements 27; Turner,
Uncontrolled Urban Development 11-12.
11 "[GJrant of ownership to squatters on public property would give them
19681
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achieving some security in their occupancy, in this view, squatters
would be more likely to improve their holdings and to take an
interest, individually and in common, in the development of their
communities. It is a matter of having a stake in the community.
Most urban squatting takes place on government-owned land,
but private land is far from safe from squatters. 12 In many in-
stances the numbers and the determination of squatters have been
so great that private landowners have been fearful for their own
safety if they should attempt to take steps for removal of squatters.
Similarly, some recent government attempts at evicting squatters
have been met by forcible resistance from the squatters.13
If it is determined that a particular squatter colony, especially
one on government land, is so well-established that its occupants
will refuse to leave under almost any circumstances, a program
for clarifying the squatters' rights in their location would probably
do much to bring about improvement of dwellings and general
conditions in the settlement. A program of this sort would be one
of legal arrangements determining questions of land ownership
and use. Such a program would also be useful where squatters
might be willing to leave if other land were made available to them,
i.e., alternative land suitable for their continued occupancy and
not needed for some immediate public purpose. Certainly such a
program would have a greater chance for effective impact if it
were supplemented by technical assistance in material improve-
ments and community organization. We will not examine such
supplemental programs here, even though their importance in
particular areas might be at least as important as legal tenure
programs. Instead, we will concentrate upon the more basic, legal
questions which must eventually be resolved in all squatter im-
provement programs, and which in most such programs would
seem to be a prerequisite to the effective implementation of any
sort of improvement measures.
We have referred already to programs which would confirm
rights of squatters in the land they have appropriated; security
of tenure there would be the immediate goal. Similarly, if a resettle-
ment program is contemplated, or one which would make new settle-
ment areas available for persons not yet in squatter status, delinea-
tion of legal rights at the outset will avoid or reduce many of the
problems associated with squatter colonies. Not the least of the
gains which new, clearly presented legal arrangements will foster
a greater incentive to improve it. Conveyance or legal rental of the property
will tend to spur law observance." Abrams, Squatter Settlements 62.
12 Abrams, Man's Struggle 13-14.
1 N.Y. Times, April 13, 1966 at 15 (Squatter Inroads Fought by Bogotd).
[Vol. XLIII
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will be public awareness that the law is attuned to the needs of the
population and can change to serve them. Seen even solely as a
matter of respect for law and public order, then, the long term
interests of society would seem to be well served by measures of
this sort. For it is certainly no indicator of a strong government
that persons can defiantly use public land contrary to declared pub-
lic policies. Nor does it promote respect for the law and existing
institutions if private owners of land can get neither enforcement
of their ownership rights nor even official acknowledgement that
their rights continue to exist.
SQUATTERS IN THE UNITED STATES
The squatting which has occurred in the United States has been
almost wholly in rural areas, and primarily involved lands owned
by the federal government on the western frontier.14 But even at the
time of the first colonists in the seventeenth century squatting was
common on lands owned by the Crown or by the settlement com-
panies commissioned by it.15 It has been pointed out that the
Pilgrims on the Mayflower settled at Plymouth as squatters.16 A
number of other early colonist groups were also squatters since
they too first made their settlements and only later secured grants
of rights from the owners of the land. Similar instances of squat-
ting occurred on state lands after the Revolution as well. The
motivation behind these instances was usually the desire for a
place to settle, make a home, and cultivate land. This was made
clear when great numbers of persons settled on the lands of what
are now the Middle West and West. Because the states had ceded
these lands to the national government soon after the adoption of
the Constitution, the squatter problem became above all a challenge
to federal government policy.
Throughout the nineteenth century, controversy grew over the
official disposition to be made of the public lands. Two principal
aspects of the controversy were (1) the question of whether the
public lands should be used primarily as a source of revenue by
sales to any interested purchasers or as a haven for actual settle-
ment regardless of the revenue produced, and (2) the question of
whether particular measures would redound more to the benefit
14 Abrams, Squatter Settlements 34, 35a. See generaUy M. Harris, Origin
of the Land Tenure System in the United States (1953); B. Hibbard, A
History of the Public Land Policies (1924); J. Hurst, Law and the Condi-
tions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States 4 (1956) ; R. Rob-
bins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936 (1950) [herein-
after cited as Robbins].
15 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 14, at 152.
16 Id. at 103, 401.
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of squatters or of speculators.17 These questions and the attempted
resolutions of them will be examined below.
There has been some urban squatting in the United States. The
most significant instances of it were in San Francisco during the
Gold Rush and in various cities during the Depression of the
1930's.1s Rural squatting has cropped up, also, in isolated instances
in the modern United States.19 "Squatters" have even been identi-
fied in a number of recent protest demonstrations involving civil
rights grievances and other matters, but these incidents do not fall
within the definition we are using, for they are essentially a dif-
ferent sort of phenomenon.
20
STATE LAW ON SQUATTERS
The Doctrine of Adverse Possession: Generally
In the colonial period and the early years of the nation, various
measures were implemented by the individual colonies, and then
states, for granting rights to squatters on public land. Since the
fundamental aspects of the most important of these measures had
their greatest eventual use at the national level, they will be dis-
cussed below. The present section will concentrate upon the doc-
trine of adverse possession in state law. We will not discuss the
related Anglo-American doctrine of "prescription," for it usually
does not pertain to disputes over basic land ownership questions,
and it is founded on certain historical usages-such as the pre-
sumption of a "lost grant"-which would most likely serve only to
complicate with legal fictions any discussion of squatter problems.21
The adverse possession doctrine is plainly relevant to squatter
problems because both have to do with illegal use of land. Squatters,
as we have said, are illegal settlers. The statutes which are the basis
of the doctrine are statutes of limitations which provide, in essence,
that after a specified period of time the owner of land will lose
17 See, e.g., Hibbard 347; Robbins 9.
18 Robbins 193; Sakolski, Land Tenure and Land Taxation in America
240 (1957); Abrams, Squatter Settlements 35a-37, 49.
19 Abrams, Man's Struggle 12.
20 N.Y. Times, February 2, 1966, at 1; N.Y. Times, April 4, 1966, at 18;
N.Y. Times, April 8, 1966, at 23; N.Y. Times, June 7, 1967, at 1.
21 See generally 2 Hilliard, The American Law of Real Property 270-74
(4th ed. 1869) [hereinafter cited as Hilhiard]; Sedgwick and Wait, Trial of
Title to Land 560 (2nd ed. 1886) [hereinafter cited as Sedgwick and Wait];
W. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession 8 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Walsh].
Not to be dealt with here are questions of "tacking" successive possessions
in adverse possession law, and of rights in improvements put on land by an
unlawful occupant. Although important questions in many cases, they are
not central to the purposes of this study.
[Vol. XLIII
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his right to remove from the land an unlawful occupant.22 On the
face of it, then, adverse possession statutes, as the limitations
statutes are often called, pose time limits on owners' rights to
evict illicit occupants such as squatters. The matter is not quite
this simple, however, for the field of adverse possession law is one
in which sketchy statutes have affected important rights in sig-
nificant ways; consequently, the courts have had to act to fI in
gaps left by the statutes' apparent effects. In so doing, numerous
questions have been raised, and the courts have attempted to pro-
vide answers. Surprisingly little-one might say shockingly little-
has been said by the legislatures and courts, however, about the
purposes of the statutes and the judicial overlay which make up
what is known as the doctrine of adverse possession.23 If nothing
else were to be shown by the United States experience with squat-
ters, at least the law of adverse possession-by its gaps and un-
certainties-would point up the need for clear thinking and
articulation of premises by legislators and judges in order that
laws relating to rights in land may be susceptible of even-handed
application and may promote the interests of society in the use of
land.
There are three questions regarding adverse possession which
should be considered here: First, has protection of squatters been
one of the purposes of the doctrine? Second, has the doctrine
actually been applied so as to protect squatters, either with or
without there being an express purpose of doing so? Third, if
adverse possession has been used to protect squatters, and even if
it has not, could it be structured and used now so as to promote
useful policies in modern squatter situations? The first two of these
questions will be considered together here because of their close
interrelationship.
The Doctrine of Adverse Possession: Purposes and Effects
There is authority for asserting that the doctrine has had the
purpose and effect of protecting squatters. Let us first consider
what we mean here by "protecting." There is general agreement
that once the statute of limitations bars the owner's action at law
22 Sedgwick and Wait, 562; W. E. Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse
Possession (pts. 1-2), 20 Iowa L. Rev. 551, 738 (1935) [hereinafter cited
as 20 Iowa L. Rev.].
23 There is virtually nothing in the books that bears on whether [the law
of adverse possession] should be the way it is; or, for that matter,
whether it should be at all. This branch of the law is suffering, as are
some others, from a fundamental difficulty: how can a particular ques-
tion be answered intelligently without some fairly explicit assumption
as to the more general task to be acomplished?
C. C. Callahan, Adverse Possession 77 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Callahan].
19681
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for recovery of land, no other relief is allowed him against the
initially unlawful possessor.24 The effect of this is to leave the
possessor with exclusive rights in the land, that is, with what is
usually called an independent, complete title founded on possession.
What has happened is that the rights in land against all the world
except the true owner, which the possessor is generally considered
to have, are made good against the owner as well once the owner's
right to evict is barred.25 It is in this sense that we can speak of an
adverse possession statute "protecting" the possessor.
Because there has been so little intelligent discussion of the
purposes of the adverse possession doctrine, the purposes must
be discovered mainly by inference from actual application of the
doctrine. The main problem for the courts in deciding when and
how an adverse possession act applies-and thus the major problem
in deciding whether squatters are to be protected-is to determine
when the owner begins to have a cause of action against which
the statute will run. In other words, if we find the courts deciding
that a squatter's activities give rise to a cause of action in the
owner which the statute can bar, then we can say squatters are
to be protected by the doctrine. If something other than squatter
status and activity is required-something which means that a
squatter's activity will not be sufficient to start the statute running
-then we will have to say that adverse possession is not intended
to protect squatters.
The Statute of Limitations Approach
The question of what activity creates a cause of action and
starts the statute running has been discussed widely by the courts
and commentators. The simplest, and most strictly logical approach
is that which the American Law of Property proposes. 26 It is a
strict emphasis upon the fact that rights by adverse possession
are based upon a statute of limitations. The action which the statute
will bar is essentially an action in ejectment. Historically this action
has been used for the recovery of possession of land from one who
has assumed possession without the owner's consent or lawful
authorization. Ejectment is not intended for use against a transient
intruder; that is the province of trespass. Ejectment is, as it is
called in modern statutes, an action "to recover the possession" of
land.27
24 3 American Law of Property § 15.2 (Casner ed. 1952); Hilliard 302-3;
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 139-41 (1918).
25 3 American Law of Property § 15.2, at 760-62; Walsh 6; Ballantine,
Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 Yale L.J. 219, 220 (1919).
26 See generally 3 American Law of Property §§ 15.1-15.4; Walsh 8, 16-20.
27 E.g., N.Y. Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 601 (McKin-
ney 1963).
[Vol. XLIII
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Once unlawful possession is gained, under this approach, the
action will lie and the statute will begin to run. The great weight
of authority has established that the use of land which will con-
stitute the requisite "possession" is the normal use which an ordi-
nary owner of the land would make of it.28 In this "statute of
limitations approach" once such possession is shown to have
existed, the action is shown to have accrued; thus, if the statutory
period has passed, the action is barred. The possessor thereby gains
a full, possessory title. In arriving at this result it is not necessary
to engage in discussion of the possessor's "adverseness" beyond
showing an unauthorized, ordinary, and exclusive use of the land;
such use constitutes the unlawful possession giving rise to the
owner's cause of action. There is little or no case law explicitly
adopting this approach, but one commentator has suggested that
it is likely to become more popular in modern decisions-especially
in those seeking to simplify the doctrine and eliminate the incon-
gruous results often arrived at in the "mistake" cases.2
28 3 American Law of Property § 15.3, at 765 ("the degree of actual use
and enjoyment of the parcel of land involved which the average owner would
exercise over similar property under like circumstances").
29 Callahan 72-73. I make the statement in the text that few cases assert
the statute of limitations approach, despite the following quotation in 3
American Law of Property § 15.4, at 776-77:
The great majority of the cases establish convincingly that the alleged
requirements of claim of title and of hostility of possession mean only
that the possessor must use and enjoy the property continuously for
the required period as the average owner would use it, without the con-
sent of the true owner and therefore in actual hostility to him irrespec-
tive of the possessor's actual state of mind or intent.
By such statements as this the editors seem to suggest that the weight of
the case law supports their strict statute of limitations approach, focusing
upon the facts of possession alone and disregarding the possessor's state of
mind. The cases cited in support of this statement, however, do not dispense
with an intent requirement. Instead they declare that an express intention
of ousting the owner and usurping his title is a permissible intention for the
purpose of gaining title by adverse possession; they do not say intent is
irrelevant. See, e.g., Guaranty Title and Trust Corp. v. United States, 264
U.S. 200, 204-5 (1924); Carpenter v. Coles, 77 N.W. 424 (Minn. 1898) ("So
the whole inquiry is reduced to the fact of entering and the intent of the
disseisor to usurp possession for himself to the exclusion of others."). These
cases retain a "hostile intent" factor of a sort we shall examine infra.
That such cases do not stand for the position favored in American Law
of Property would be clearest in a "mistake" case; the statute of limitations
approach would afford protection to a possessor who innocently believed he
owned the land where the "hostile intent" approach would not. Even though
an approach such as that in Abel v. Love, 143 N.E. 515 (Ind. App. 1924), cited
by the editors, might allow the mistaken possessor to gain title by adverse
possession, it would do so only through the logical inconsistency of presuming
an adverse intent from the occupant's acts of ownership even though the facts
made clear that no such intent existed.
A case such as Abel admittedly is, in its result, very close to what the edi-
tors favor, but it still does not have the simplicity or directness of the editors'
approach and should not be considered as standing directly for it. This appears
to be true of most of the cases relied on by the editors on this point. One review
HeinOnline  -- 43 Tul. L. Rev. 103 1968-1969
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The effect of this approach would seem to be to protect pos-
sessors, such as squatters, because of the fact of their possession
alone and wholly apart from the questions of intent. Even a pos-
sessor acting under some innocent mistake about his rights would
seem to be protected. The authorities, often regardless of the par-
ticular approach being taken, do speak of protection of actual
possession as a purpose of the doctrine; they speak as much of it
as they speak in depth of any one particular purpose. The idea is
usually phrased as protection of settlers, of those who actually put
the land to use, by affording them security in their occupancy after
the statutory period has passed.3 0 It has been stated that it is a
positive effect of the doctrine, even if not an underlying policy of
it, that actual settlers are to be protected, that their labors are to
be rewarded by security of possession and full ownership. Since
the settlers being referred to apparently are persons without lawful
grounds for being on the land, and since the statute of limitations
approach confirms title in such persons without inquiry into their
intent, it would seem that this approach has the effect, and prob-
ably the purpose, of protecting squatters.
The Present Right Approach
The "present right" approach represents another approach to
the determination of what activity by an unlawful occupant will
produce a cause of action which will start the adverse possession
statute running. It is used in a substantial number of jurisdictions
and has been assumed by some commentators to be the correct
view. It asserts that rights by adverse possession can be gained
only if the occupant asserts and believes-however mistakenly in
fact-that he has a present right of ownership which gives legal
validity to his occupancy. This requirement as to the possessor's
belief, or intention, is usually referred to as "claim of right" or
"claim of title."31 It must be noted that many adverse possession
of their discussion of adverse possession has pointed out their failure to ac-
knowledge that many courts have required more than possession in deciding
what the elements of an adverse possession are to be. Symposium on American
Law of PFoperty, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 349, 368 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
Symposium].30 "For the protection of those who occupied titled lands, the Congress of
the Republic [of Texas] fixed short terms of adverse possession whereby the
title was transferred to the adverse occupant, holding under the conditions
stated in the statute. ... The policy, of course, was justified for the protec-
tion and security of the actual settlers, so necessary to the growth and future
prosperity of the state." W. Simkins, Title by Limitation in Texas 2 (1924)
[hereinafter cited as Simkins]. See, e.g., Callahan 86; Sedgwick and Wait 565;
R. Tyler, Ejectment and the Law of Adverse Enjoyment 864 (1871); Abrams,
Squatter Settlements 69.
31 Tyler, supra note 30, at 859 ("for the protection of those who have re-
mained in possession under a title supposed to be good"). Cf. Ballantine, Title
104 [Vol. XLIII
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statutes specify that the owner's cause of action runs only against
one who unlawfully occupies under a claim of right or title.3 2
Other statutes require that the occupant claim under "color of
title," and this is generally considered to refer to some written in-
strument which the occupant believes confers title upon him.33
Since squatters nowadays seldom, if ever, have such instruments to
support their conduct, we will focus mainly upon the statutes which
require only a claim of right or title; we shall also consider statutes
which do not specify any such requirement but which have had it
added by judicial construction.
One possible source of confusion should be touched upon at the
outset. On the surface it seems that the present right approach,
no matter how the requirement may be phrased, would deny the
benefits of the statute of limitations to the possessor who does
not claim such a right and, conversely, would deny to the owner a
cause of action against a possessor who does claim this right. This
apparent effect of the present right view is pointed out as a key
weakness by proponents of the statute of limitations view.3 4 Since
it is not necessary for our inquiry to resolve this question, it should
be sufficient to point out that the present right view probably does
assume, and courts applying it would make certain, that the owner
still has the right to evict the intruder even though the intruder is
not making a claim sufficient to vest title in him eventually. This re-
sult could be achieved by saying that in such an instance the owner's
remedy is in trespass against the temporary intruder, rather than
ejectnent against an unlawful possessor whose status as such
could be established only by a claim of present right. Another,
probably simpler, tack would be to say that the ejectment remedy
will continue to run against the occupant and will not be barred
unless he establishes the requisite possession for the statutory
period; this does introduce a kind of dual standard into the eject-
ment remedy, but under the present right approach there would
seem to be justifiable reasons for it.35 Other expressions of the legal
by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 135 (1918) ("to quiet all titles which
are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and
correct errors in conveyancing").
32 See statutes cited in 20 Iowa L. Rev. at 551-54.
33 Id.
S4 3 American Law of Property § 15.4, at 774.
35 That the dual standard ejectment remedy is what the courts might con-
template in these circumstances is suggested by the large number of cases in
which statements appear similar to the following comment in a recent Indian
treatise: "A squatter upon a land even holding possession for the statutory
period would not acquire title by adverse possession unless the possession is also
under a claim of title .... " Krishnaswami, Adverse Possession (4th ed. 1963).
See, e.g., Jasperson v. Scharnikow, 150 F. 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1907) ("This idea
of acquiring title by larceny does not go in this country."); Missouri Lumber
and Mining Co. v. Chronister, 259 S.W. 1042 (Mo. 1924).
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grounds for this result probably could be formulated so as to be
certain, in the present right conception, that by claiming less than
a present ownership right the unlawful occupant does not wholly
deprive the owner of the remedies which he would have against a
more clearly hostile entrant upon the land. In short, the present
right approach should not be considered worthless because of this
surface incongruity.
The central purpose of the present right position seems to be
to protect and secure the possession of persons who occupy land
while asserting their mistaken belief that they have at present a
rightful claim to it.36 If we say-as has been done almost always
in adverse possession cases since the original English statute of
1623 7-that statutes of limitation are "statutes of repose" and
that with regard to land they aim at the "quieting of men's estates,"
we can say further that the present right requirement means pro-
tection will be given to the possessory estate only of one who ac-
tually believes he has a legal estate as well. Squatters, therefore,
would not be protected, for as we have seen in defining squatters,
participants in large squatting movements are generally well aware
that the land is owned by persons other than themselves.
The Hostile Intent Approach
There is another interpretation given to statutes which require
claim of right or title and even to some which do not; this approach
would not require a claim of present right, but would consider as
sufficient either (1) an intention to gain and hold exclusive pos-
session for the statutory period so as to gain title under the
The notion in these cases seems to be that no title by adverse possession can
be gained by one even in full possession of the land if he does not claim a pres-
ent right to it; such persons are often called "squatters" or "mere squatters" by
courts taking a present right approach. These courts still allow the ejectment
remedy to run against such occupants. As the Restatement of Property de-
scribes this result:
In the law of adverse possession many results are reached which do notfollow from the usual meaning of the words of the statute of limitations.
Thus, although the statutes are silent as to any required state of mind of
the defendant, a right of action that has existed for longer than the
statutory period may still be exercised if the defendant did not claim
"adversely," as that word has been defined.
2 Restatement of Property, ch. 15, at 892 (1936).
"Squatter" is given another colloquial meaning, i.e. one who is on another's
land knowing it belongs to the other, and either making it clear he would leave
whenever the owner wished or giving the owner reason to believe he would do
so. See Sykes v. Hayes, 23 F. Cas. 584 (No. 13709) (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1874). Cf. 3
American Law of Property § 15.4, at 776.
36 Supra note 31.
87 An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for Avoiding of Suits in Law, 21
Jac. I, c. 16.
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adverse possession statute,88 or (2) a more general intent to oust
the true owner and maintain possession in the manner of an owner
indefinitely.39 This view, which might be called the "hostile intent"
approach, is quite different from the present right view. It is
closer to the statute of limitations view, and actually differs from
it only by the addition of the element of intent. Whereas the
statute of limitations position protects any full possessor regardless
of his intent and without an inquiry into it, the hostile intent con-
cept requires the possessor to have and make known-by words,
conduct, or both-his intent to gain title under the statute or some-
how otherwise to deny the owner the benefits of ownership. Both
this view and the statute of limitations approach redound to the
benefit of squatters, who do have the requisite possession in most
cases and who are also likely to have an intention to obtain owner-
ship by adverse possession where the doctrine is established. If the
squatters do not know of the possibility of gaining ownership by
adverse possession, or if the doctrine does not exist, an intention
by them to gain ownership through some other governmental action
under existing legislation, or under legislation which the squatters
would like to have enacted, is quite likely and ought to suffice under
the hostile intent approach, for the requisite claim of right or title.
Other Views of Purposes and Effects
Two of the conceptions of adverse possession which we have
examined have indicated a purpose to protect squatters. We might
even infer from the results they suggest that this is their principal
purpose. While saying this, however, it must be borne in mind that
because adverse possession is based on statutes of limitation, the
doctrine necessarily has been applied on a case by case basis-
that is, when the statute is raised as a defense to an owner's action
to recover land. It has been used, therefore, more to deal with
specific squatters, often in small, isolated squatting situations,
than it has been for settling the rights of large groups of squatters
all at once or in any integrated series of steps.
It should be repeated that the purposes of adverse possession
8 "[Claim of right] means, then, a purpose to appropriate the land of
another to one's own exclusive use, with or without any other evidence of right,
other than the right to obtain the title by conforming to the conditions of the
statute transferring title by limitation." Simkins at 7.
89 Supra note 29, and cases cited therein; Sedgwick and Wait 566-67, 615.
It should be pointed out that the three approaches I am describing on the
question of the main requisites of an adverse possession correspond in a rough
way to three views of the phrase "claim of right" mentioned in Symposium 368
& n.11. Also, it should be noted that the three approaches often exist alongside
one another in jurisdictions in multiple adverse possession statutes with differ-
ent terms.
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are but vaguely stated in the law; we can ascertain the purposes
only by looking to actual or suggested applications of the doctrine.
This we have done above, referring to different approaches taken
within the doctrine and to some explicit statements of purpose.
We have seen protection of unlawful settlers as a purpose of the
statute of limitations approach and the hostile intent approach,
and we have seen protection only of those settlers who honestly
claim some present right to the land as the purpose of the present
right approach.
Other purposes have been asserted by various authorities as
underlying the doctrine of adverse possession. An accurate descrip-
tion of the doctrine must recognize that a number of purposes
have entered into the formulations of it.40 For our discussion of
squatters it might be enough that we can say a substantial body of
legislation and case law has had the effect of protecting squatters
in their possession of land. Explicit declarations that this is a
purpose of adverse possession add further to the relevance which
the doctrine thus has for modern squatter problems. In order that
the use of the doctrine in this country be fully understood, however,
we should consider some of the other purposes attributed to it at
times.
First, as noted above, statutes of limitation are frequently
termed statutes of repose. The idea usually put forward is that
after a substantial period has passed, persons enjoying certain
rights, and others associated with them, relying upon the state of
affairs, should be able to continue their conduct without disturbance
from those who much later would assert that they are entitled to
the rights in question.41 There is an element of protection of reli-
ance here, or what might be seen as a purpose of stabilizing the
social and legal order. There are also practical questions for the
courts and litigants when suits are brought on stale claims, that
is, on claims which are old and which often can be litigated only
with the aid of remaining witnesses' faded memories. If stale
claims could be freely brought, the difficulties of preparing a
defense might well be compounded; for example, occupants of land
who had a presumably lawful basis for their entry, or whose pre-
decessors had this, might find it difficult to secure the proof neces-
sary for what might otherwise be a valid defense. 42
Thus it can be said that the considerations commonly associated
40 For a modern summary in outline form of policy considerations relevant
in adverse possession cases, see Symposium, 369 n.14 ("The policy considera-
tions are not necessarily in accord with one another and an actual decision may
involve balancing contending considerations.").
41 See, e.g., Sedgwick and Wait 564.
42 Callahan 83-87.
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with ordinary statutes of limitations problems are also important
considerations underlying the purpose of the adverse possession
doctrine. These considerations, however, do not all point in the
same direction in all cases. For example, it would seem that stat-
utes of limitation with shorter periods have in view the evidentiary
considerations less than considerations such as protection of an
occupant's possession, i.e., his "repose." The shortest adverse pos-
session periods appear to be those in color of title statutes; the
periods are shorter, we should probably assume, because the
possessor's entry on the land is considered by the legislature to
be a more legitimate, meritorious one than is the entry of a person
without color of title, such as a person holding under some un-
written claim of present right or one claiming no present right at
all, i.e., a squatter.43 The practical evidentiary questions underlying
statutes of limitations generally do not justify the shorter period
for the color of title possessor; one might even say the period should
be longer for him since his evidence of right, a written instrument,
is probably easier to preserve than is evidence supporting an un-
written claim of right.
What all of this suggests is simply that policy choices, especially
as to who and how readily the adverse possession statutes will
provide protection, have entered into the preparation of the statutes
and into their application. 44 It is not enough to describe adverse
possession as just another instance of the usual considerations
underlying statutes of limitation; one must try to discern the
policy choices which have been made. And if one is considering
a new statute to be prepared, he must decide what policies he wishes
the statute to advance and must try to design the statute to achieve
this.
Questions of purpose have often been raised with regard to the
doctrine's bearing on the rights and duties of the true owner of
land which is being occupied unlawfully. For one thing it is said
that the limitations statutes have the function of punishing the
owner who is negligent in enforcing his rights.45 One modern
student of the law of adverse possession has dismissed this sug-
gestion by saying that punishment is the province of criminal
statutes, not of civil statutes of limitations. 46 His view is correct,
it would seem, to the extent that it makes clear that punishment is
not a major purpose of the doctrine; yet one clear effect of the doc-
43 Simkins 4; Symposium 368 n.12.
44 Cf. Callahan 54-55.
45 See Symposium 369 n.14. Cf. J. Angell, The Rule of Law Which Creates
A Right to An Incorporeal Hereditament by An Adverse Enjoyment 12, 18
(1827); Sedgwick and Wait 599.
46 Callahan 90-91.
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trine is that negligent owners are punished in the sense of being
deprived of enforcement of their rights after a period of time.
However, one key question posed by the modern squatter situations
described above is whether an owner who is prevented by the sheer
force and determination of squatters from asserting his rights
should ever have those rights barred by operation of a statute of
limitations.
Another form that the concern for the owner's position may
take is the statement that the doctrine must insure fairness to the
owner by placing certain requirements on the possessor before the
possessor will be entitled to the doctrine's protection.47 This con-
sideration will assure that the owner has a fair chance of noticing
what is happening on his property and of doing something about
it. As an indication of the difficulty of assessing the relative impor-
tance of different purposes of the doctrine, it may be noted that
these requirements-which usually are phrased in terms of the
entrant's possession having to be actual, open, notorious, con-
tinuous, exclusive, etc.--seem to be explicable as serving the pur-
pose of fair notice to the owner just as easily as they are explicable
as serving the purpose of protecting actual settlers rather than
just temporary intruders. 48 That the balance which has been struck
has given some greater weight to the latter purpose is suggested
by the fact that no explicit requirement is made that the occupant
take steps directly aimed at giving notice of the adverse occupancy
to the owner, even when the owner's identity and whereabouts are
known to the occupant. The concern thus seems to have been more,
one might say, with the interests of the hardworking settler than
with the absent landowner. Unfortunately, in the absence of author-
itative statements on the point, we can do little more than speculate
about possible policy determinations such as this. We at least can
isolate some of those factors, however, which have gone into the
law of adverse possession, so that future legal doctrines and mea-
sures can be based upon a deeper understanding of the policies
which may be given effect by legislative and judicial decisions in
this field.
It has been said that one purpose of adverse possession is to
promote the active use of land.49 We have already examined the
47 Sedgwick and Wait 599; of. Symposium n.14.
48 See 3 American Law of Property § 15.3, at 768.
49 Sedgwick and Wait 564 ("it is contrary to the interests of the states that
lands should lie uncultivated during the litigation over the title to them, and....
therefore, a limitation should be put upon such litigation"); Simldns 2; Sym-
posium 369 n.14. But see Callahan 91-92, in which it is questioned (1) whether
we need to encourage the use of land through such means as adverse possession
and (2) whether adverse possession can effectively encourage the development
if there is a great need for it. Callahan implies that if there is a need to
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purpose of protecting settlers, and such protection appears to be
one way of promoting land use. If we say that limitations periods
and possession requirements are formulated on the basis of some
sort of weighing, however unarticulated it may be, of the interests
of users such as settlers against the interests of owners who have
not attempted to use the land, then we are saying that promotion
of normal uses of land is a possible purpose of adverse possession.
It is clearly an effect of the doctrine, for all the approaches we have
examined have required actual use of the land in a way for which it
is suited. Thus it is probably accurate to say that active land use
has in fact been a purpose of the doctrine, and it is certainly safe to
say that formulation of new adverse possession statutes for modern
problems should take into account the effect which such statutes
could have on promotion of land use. Where adverse possessors are
already on the land, the doctrine secures their possession and, pre-
sumably, the continued use of the land by them and their successors.
Where land is not in use, the prospect of gaining title by adverse
possession may well be an invitation in some instances, although
probably not many, to new users of the land.50 The shorter the
statutory period, the more likely the latter result will occur.
Consideration of adverse possession as a means of promoting
the use of land suggests an examination of the possibility of ac-
quisition by adverse possession against the government. Generally
in this country it has been held that one cannot gain rights by
adverse possession on land owned by a unit of government. 51 As to
land owned by the national government, this position has usually
been simply a question of federalism; that is, a state adverse pos-
session statute cannot limit the rights of the national government.52
As against a state government and its local subdivisions, the
encourage land use it is because of overpopulation rather than excess land; he
also seems to assume that adverse possession is useful only if the latter circum-
stance is behind the policy of promoting land use. It should be clear by now that
our discussion is exploring the possibility which is the opposite of that assum-
tion; namely, the possibility that adverse possession can be useful in crowded,
overpopulated urban areas.
50 See Callahan 92.
51 See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 554 (1957). Explicit statutes allowing
adverse possession against a government unit are usually narrowly construed,
but upheld. See Hall v. Webb, 21 W. Va. 318, 322 (1883).
52 See, e.g., Redfield v. Parks, 132 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1889). See also Sim-
mons v. Ogle, 105 U.S. 271, 273 (1882) where the following reason is given for
the general rule prohibiting adverse possession against the government:
For so common is it for squatters and trespassers to settle on the lands
of the United States, and so indulgent are the laws in encouraging such
settlements, and so numerous are these settlements without claim of
right, and such is the impossibility of resisting or ejecting the settlers,
or of efficiently asserting the right of possession by the government, that
the weight of the inference in favor of any claim of right, whether legal
or equitable, against the United States, growing out of mere possession,
is very slight indeed.
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impossibility of adverse possession has most often been called a
result of the "sovereignty" or "sovereign immunity" of the state
from its own limitations statutes.53 More deeply considered, the
idea seems to be that the state, and the public, should not suffer
a loss of important property rights because of the negligence of
public servants in failing to protect these rights. Certainly the fact
that the interests of the public, rather than of a single individual
or private institution, are involved in state ownership of land plays
a large role in this thinking. The possibility of collusion between
adverse possessors and government officers, over the course of time
and to the detriment of the general community, may be an even
firmer underlying reason for the policy of adverse possession not
accruing against the government.
In a few jurisdictions, notably California, adverse possession
has been allowed by judicial doctrine to accrue on land owned by
the state or units of local government if the land is not being used
for, and has not been reserved for, public purposes.54 This suggests
that a policy is being advanced in favor of the use of land, as
opposed to its lying idle even under clearly identified ownership
such as that of a governmental unit. Thus it would seem that if the
policy of the government is to promote worthwhile land use, and if
adverse possession is designated as one vehicle for this purpose,
the doctrine can have broader possible effect, and can even aid in
the planning of land uses, if it is drawn to afford adverse possession
against the government in certain areas where the encouragement
of land use is desirable. If this is allowable as to local government
units, as it is so limited in some jurisdictions, 5 it is hard to see
why it should not also be allowable as to the state itself. Debates
as to the content of "sovereignty" and as to which sub-units of the
state partake of that quality56 should be put aside in favor of
careful, legislative policy-making.57
53 See, e.g., Bright v. New Orleans Rys. Co., 114 La. 679, 38 So. 494 (1905);
J. Gill, Sovereign Immunity Under Statutes of Limitation, 16 Ohio St. L.J. 178
(1955). See also Cook v. Foster, 7 Ill. (2 Gflm.) 652 (1845) (U.S. government
has rights of a "sovereign" in its public land.).
54 See Richart v. San Diego, 109 Cal. App. 548, 293 P. 673 (1930) and cases
there cited; Annot., supra note 51, at 598. A number of states have statutes
explicitly allowing limitations to run against the state or other governmental
sub-units. See statutes cited at 20 Iowa L. Rev. 739-40.
55 See Annot. supra note 51, at 612.
56 For an example of a case distinguishing treatment of municipal property
on a "sovereignty" basis, see Black v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 86 N.E. 1065
(1909).
57 Care is essential in this area because, as we have seen, there are risks
here which probably only honesty and efficiency in the administration of govern-
ment can overcome.
It is worth mentioning, with regard to adverse possession against a unit of
government, that since even an unlawful possessor of land has rights to it
against all the world except the true owner, then if a government is the owner,
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The final area to be explored in determining the purpose of the
adverse possession doctrine is the relationship of adverse possession
to a title recording system. Professor Charles Callahan, in his
recent lectures on adverse possession, observed that the most
frequently stated purpose of the doctrine has been "the clearing of
title to land.""" He considers this purpose part of an overriding
policy of facilitating transfers of land. The original "quieting of
men's estates" phrase is explained by him as referring "not to the
repose of the individual person which may arise from the statute,"
but instead to encouraging transferability of land. He suggests that
adverse possession has sought to serve this purpose: it assures a
purchaser from one who has long-standing record title that no
ownership claims will ever successfully challenge the vendor's right
to convey title; adverse possession can defeat an undiscovered
defect in the vendor's title which is not shown by the record. But
Callahan's analysis of the adverse possession shows, quite cor-
rectly, that it is not an effective instrument for facilitating land
transfers through reliance on the recording system. In the first
place, as he says, adverse possession gives title even to persons
outside the record; their title can easily have the effect of denying
reliability to purchases made on the basis of a recorded ownership.
Secondly, the only possessors which the recording system and
adverse possession together can protect are possessors who claim
under recorded color of title or some other recorded claim of present
right. But, as Callahan does point out, protection of purchasers
from these persons is really just a matter of reliability of the
record; the vendor's possession, adverse or otherwise, is largely
irrelevant to the purchaser who wants a record title safe from
inconsistent claims.59 Thus the marketable title statutes, and the
"curative statutes" which erase infirmities caused by minor con-
a decision by it not to assert its ownership rights would seem to have the effect
of giving the possessor all the rights he would normally need in order to use the
land freely and in security. Cf. Page v. Fowler, 28 Cal. 605 (1865) ; 3 Am. Jur.
2d Adverse Possession § 205, at 297 ("Even where the statute does not run
against the government one may acquire rights in public lands by adverse occu-
pancy against all third persons, and this is true even though the claimant
admits the government's ownership .. ."). But we should remember that he
still would not have full, formal ownership-title; thus he might not be able to
make the fullest use of the land. For example, he might not be able to mortgage
it, and he would remain subject to a later reversal of government policy. As a
temporary measure, however, a legislative or executive decision that the gov-
ernment will not assert its ownership rights for a given period or given area
might be useful in some squatter situations.
58 Callahan 92. Cf. Symposium 368 ("one of the really important func-
tions of adverse possession; to limit title examination to a reasonable scope and
to quiet the title of purchasers with respect to ancient defects that cannot be
discovered under our disorderly recording system even by a reasonably diligent
title examiner.").
59 Callahan 104.
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veyancing defects, serve the purpose Callahan has in mind much
more clearly than adverse possession ever can.60
In fact it can be suggested that there is little evidence of
what Callahan says is the most often mentioned purpose of adverse
possession. It is probably true that a principal effect of the present
right approach and of color of title acts is that record titles are
more reliable;61 but there is still the great leeway for titles by
adverse possession, wholly apart from the recording system and
easily disrupting its certainty. Furthermore, we have seen that a
considerable body of law on adverse possession does not relate to
possessors with claims of present legal rights, but rather to squat-
ters who make no such claims and really have little to do with or
to gain from the recording system. It is only after a squatter ob-
tains title by adverse possession that he can enter the recording
system-though it is not even necessary for the validity of his
title-by means of a judgment or decree which confirms his title
and which he can record.62 Callahan's discussion, in short, con-
tributes only a recognition that the present right approach does
have something to offer to the usefulness of the recording system.
A last point regarding Callahan's analysis pertains to those
states having title registration statutes. Those statutes generally
provide that a registered title cannot be acquired by adverse pos-
session.63 Callahan concludes that under such statutes the registra-
tion schemes have displaced the doctrine of adverse possession in
the function of promoting certainty of titles. This may be true if
only the present right approach is considered; when a registration
system is in effect, there is little or no basis for an occupant to
believe he has a valid present right of ownership apart from the
system. Since we have seen, however, that many policies are at work
in the doctrine, it is probably more accurate to explain these provi-
sions by saying that the certainty the registration schemes seek
to provide has been considered subject to significant-and un-
desirable-erosion if adverse possession is allowed. The question
which remains for future research and legislation is how the ad-
vantages of workable registration schemes can be harmonized with
adverse possession policies such as the promotion of land use by
protecting actual settlers.
,0 Callahan 105.
61 Some statutes which include a present right requirement even do so in
terms of a recorded instrument. See, e.g., Texas Ann. Civ. Stat. art. 5509
(Vernon 1958).
62 3 American Law of Property § 15.14, at 830.
63 See statutes cited in 20 Iowa L. Rev. at 742.
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Implications for Modern Squatter Problems
On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is apparent that
the United States experience suggests a number of policies that
can be served by the law of adverse possession. Which policy is
effectuated will depend largely upon how the doctrine is formu-
lated. If our immediate goal is to provide the squatters with secu-
rity in their possession, while at the same time allowing the
landowners a fair opportunity to utilize and enforce their existing
property rights consistent with overall government land programs,
we can include adverse possession statutes as one means of ap-
proaching this goal. Any statute which is formulated, however,
should be drawn so as to avoid the many uncertainties which have
accompanied the doctrine as it has developed in this country. Let
us consider some of the main features of such a statute.64
64 Below is a suggested potential draft of an adverse possession law based
upon the discussion in the text accompanying note 64. It is "partial" in that
provisions are not included which would be highly dependent for their content
upon facts of the particular situation at which the statute would be aimed:
AN ACT
(a) to afford an owner of real property a fair and reasonable oppor-
tunity to make use of his property and to enforce his exclusive rights
to it, and (b), after said opportunity has passed, to promote the
beneficial and productive use of the property by vesting full owner-
ship rights in the occupant proven to have had possession as herein
defined for the full statutory period.
Section 1. An action for the recovery of real property from one who
has possession of it as defined in Section 4, without the express consent
of the owner of the property or under the provisions of Section 5, shall
be brought only within year(s) from the time the possession was
first obtained.
COMMENT: This section could be modified, or multiple provisions
could be included, to allow different limitations periods for different
types of areas. Also, graduated periods could be established for the
initial years of the Act's operation.
Section 2. If an action referred to in Section 1 is not brought within
the period there specified, full and exclusive ownership shall vest in the
possessor of the property there specified, or in his legal successors if he
be not living or has made a valid transfer of his interest.
COMMENT: This section does not cover the problems of succession
of interest, or "tacking," fully and is not intended to do so.
Section 3. The ownership vested under Section 2 shall be capable of
being duly recorded upon decree of a court of law establishing the exis-
tence of the facts necessary for the operation of Section 1. Such decree
may be obtained upon petition of the possessor, provided that notice and
an opportunity to be heard are given to all interested parties, including
the owner whose action is alleged to have been barred by Section 1.
COMMENT: Decision of cases such as those provided for in this
Section might be entrusted to a special judicial or quasi-judicial
agency established for this purpose.
Section 4. Possession, as used in this Act, is defined as exclusive, overt,
continuous, residential or occupational use of an identifiable area of land
in a manner reasonably appropriate to the character of the land.
COMMENT: Specific uses which would constitute possession in par-
ticular areas could be specified in this Section or additional sections.
Section 5. In determining whether possession has been established under
Section 4, and in any other determination under this Act, the intent of
the possessor shall not be considered; except: If it is proven by the
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First of all, the legislation should declare its purpose; presum-
ably it will declare something similar to the goal which we have
just stated and which we examined above. Secondly, it should
reject the present right approach in favor of a strict statute of
limitations approach. The latter will protect squatters without
requiring complicated, subjective inquiries into the occupants' in-
tentions. Our statute should specify that, regardless of his inten-
tion, the occupant will gain a full title, capable of being officially
recognized and recorded, at the end of the statutory period if
during that time he has engaged in an exclusive, continuous, overt,
reasonable residential or occupational use of the land without the
owner's express consent.
Actually, one provision may be necessary which does bring in
the factor of the occupant's intent. It would state that in an
instance in which the owner does consent, expressly or tacitly, to
the squatters' continued and indefinite use of his land, then if the
squatters nevertheless make clear that they do not acknowledge
the consent and the implicit assumption that the consent is limited
and could be withdrawn and thus change their status, they can still
gain title at the end of the statutory period. This provision, of
course, injects an element of the hostile intent approach into some
cases; this is necessary so that an owner will not be able to assert
in any given case that he has consented and has thus denied the
squatter the possibility of having his settlement confirmed with
ownership rights. This provision would probably be one of the
most controversial in the statute because it clearly offers protec-
tion to the defiant, consciously wrongdoing occupant. It still pro-
motes actual land use and settlement, however, and does allow the
owner to know of and enforce his rights before the statute has run.
The use requirements in the statute mainly serve to insure that
title goes only to actual users of the land; a subsidiary function is
to give owners reason to know of the occupancy. For particular
locations the statutes might specify uses which, at least presump-
tively, would constitute sufficient possession; this would be in the
hope of encouraging them. Limitation periods might also be made
to correspond roughly to the type and the location of the land, in
order to provide a fair opportunity for the occupant to make clear
that he is in possession and for the owner to have notice of what is
transpiring. Shorter periods should encourage greater land use
owner that he expressly consented to continued use of the property by
the possessor, the possessor shall not be denied the benefit of this Act if
he shall prove that he made known to the owner his refusal to abide by
the conditions of the consent, if there be any, such as a condition, ex-
press or implied, that the consent was given subject to its later
revocation.
(Vol. XLIII
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more quickly; thus they may be applied usefully to areas, especially
urban areas, in which many people need the use of relatively small
amounts of available land and in which it should not be difficult for
an owner to keep up-to-date on the condition of his property. If a
title registration system exists or is being instituted, a clear state-
ment must be made as to how claims by adverse possession will fit
into it-assuming we decide that the doctrine promotes policies of
sufficient importance so that the registration scheme should not
prohibit the doctrine altogether. Perhaps one means of harmonizing
the doctrine with the registration scheme would be simply to require
adverse possessors to register their claims in a reasonable time after
their possession begins or after the statutory period has run. Some-
thing similar to this was required under the federal preemption
laws, as we shall see below.
The length of the statutory periods highlights the problems
surrounding the promulgation of a new adverse possession statute,
especially one with a short limitation period in circumstances in
which squatters already are present. The central problem is fairness
to the owner: Will he be given a real opportunity to enforce his
rights before they will be transferred to the squatters ?65 One solu-
tion for this might be to have graduated statutory periods. For
example, for possessions existing upon the promulgation of the
statute or begun during its first year, five years subsequent pos-
session will be sufficient to vest rights in the squatters; possessions
begun in the second year will vest in four years; possessions begun
in the third year will vest in three years; and so on until the basic
statutory period is reached. 68
Another problem with the enactment of the statute is that
adverse possession statutes, by their very nature as statutes of
limitation, contain the possibility of not promoting land use policies
at all. This is because a diligent owner with a competent lawyer
can simply have legal proceedings instituted to protect his rights
whenever they are threatened; if he succeeds, the squatters are left
out in the cold. Certainly upon the passage of the new act it would
indicate legislative duplicity, weakness, or both if the assumption
were made that during the initial running of the statutory period
the owners would not be able in fact to secure the enforcement of
their rights-that is, the rights allowed in the statute. Such an
65 See Hilliard 285-86, where it is pointed out that statutes of limitation
usually operate only prospectively and that if they wholly deprive an owner of
his remedies, they would deny fundamental protections of private property.
16 Although the calculation of the appropriate period is based on many
factors which are hard to quantify, I would suggest for general fairness to
owners and to distinguish actual users of the land from transitory trespassers,
that one or two years would be a minimum in almost any situation.
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assumption might mean that rights of the existing squatters would
be secured, it is true, but it would be regrettable to do so by passing
a law knowing it would not be enforceable in important respects.
The significant implication of this discussion is that policies
for the protection of squatters can probably be initiated most ef-
fectively not by adverse possession laws but by more direct means
such as the federal measures we will examine below. Adverse
possession statutes, on the framework I have described here,
would seem to be more useful as supplementary measures to be
used for continuing adjustment of the interests of squatters and
owners after more direct, large-scale measures have been instituted
to confront head-on the legal problems of squatter status. Another
way of stating the reason for this conclusion is to point out that
the doctrine operates only case by case, as already mentioned;
effective planning and regulation of squatter areas requires more
comprehensiveness and coordination in the regularization of legal
rights than adverse possession can provide.67 The only possibility
which comes to mind for a broad, integrated use of adverse posses-
sion would be, as has been discussed, an explicit waiver by the
government of its immunity in certain areas from acquisition by
adverse possession. Additionally, the application of adverse pos-
session statutes might conceivably be entrusted to a special judicial
or quasijudicial agency for the purpose of settling adverse posses-
sion claims on a regular basis. This would be done by requiring, for
example, that all claims for specified geographical areas be brought
before the agency during designated, well-publicized periods of
time. There is nothing apparent in the United States law of adverse
possession, however, to suggest that such steps have ever been
taken here or that the United States experience with the doctrine
has much to offer on this suggestion. Instead, for planned attacks
on squatter problems, we must turn to the federal legislation.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON SQUATTERS
In this section we will examine the main pieces of federal
legislation which were to deal with the squatters on the lands
owned by the national government. The first such legislation was
an act which attempted primarily to prevent any squatting on any
public lands. This was the Intrusion Act of 1807.68 It ordered for-
cible removal of unauthorized settlers on government land, although
it did allow government officials in some instances to secure agree-
67 The possibility of joinder of many squatter defendants in an owner's
ejectnent action is noted at Sedgwick and Wait 161. This possibility does not,
however, provide the type of broad approach discussed in the text.
68 2 Stat. 445 (1807). See Robbins 26. ("This act was a typical example of
eastern ignorance of western conditions.")
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ments that the settlers could remain as tenants at will until the
government decided they should leave. This act proved impossible
to enforce, and in 1828, a Congressional committee reported that
settlements on public lands could not be prevented amidst the
expectation that the lands would soon be put on the public market
for sale. Moreover, many people had no land at all or only ex-
hausted land in most cases. 9 It became clear quite early that a flat
prohibition was not the answer to the squatter problem.
A dispute had raged, from the time of the cessions of land to
the new government by the original states, over whether the public
lands should be disposed of cautiously, with the purpose of pro-
ducing as much revenue as possible, or liberally, for the purpose
of facilitating actual settlement. We shall not go into a detailed
discussion of the various changes in policy which took place over
the years as the controversy continued, for the history of that has
been well examined ;70 our concern here is with the value of par-
ticular legal measures, and particular pieces of legislation. By way
of summary, however, the following observation seems sufficient:
The history of the United States from the founding to the
period of the Civil War . . . records a prolonged contest
between a government that asserted ownership to its land,
and squatters who asserted rights to it. Attitudes toward
squatters varied with the politics of the region and fluc-
tuated with the pressures of the period.... But federal of-
ficials felt it was impossible to dislodge the settlers or to
prevent the settlement. Pressures for turning over land to
squatters developed, taking form in the passage of successive
preemption laws from 1830 to 1862. In the long run, the
squatters won the preferential right to buy their land.7 1
The Preemption Laws
The preemption right was the principal means adopted by the
federal government for clarifying the rights of squatters on the
public lands. This right granted the option to buy government land
which the squatter had settled and improved at a minimum price
and-above all-without competition from other purchasers. Early
federal preemption statutes, even before 1830, applied to limited
and specific areas of public land where squatting was taking place
and they were invariably the result of intense political pressure
by squatter groups. 72 These acts, and the broader Act of May 29,
69 See Report of House Committee on Public Lands quoted in Hibbard 151,
351-52.
70 See generally Hibbard; Robbins.
71 Abrams, Squatter Settlements 34.
72 See A. Bertrand and F. Corty, Rural Land Tenure in the United States
52 (1962); Harris, supra note 18, at 401; Hibbard 144.
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1830,78 were retrospective, for under them only one who had al-
ready settled could file his preemption claim and thus purchase the
land apart from the general auction sales.
In 1841 the general Preemption Act was passed. This Act
allowed preemption claims to be made by settlers on almost any
surveyed portion of the public domain.74 It has been aptly pointed
out that there were four principles underlying the preemption
policy set forth in the Act of 1841.15 First, settlement of the public
domain was recognized as more important than revenue from it.
Second, the public domain was not to be distributed to persons
already holding sufficient land. Third, the public domain was to
be settled in small farms, so that the largest number of persons
could benefit by gaining legal holdings. The provisions embodying
73 4 Stat. 420. See also the earlier, state preemption statutes there cited.
74 5 Stat. 453. The 1830 Act had not specified surveyed or unsurveyed land,
so both seemed to be open to preemption; the 1841 Act was limited to surveyed
land. See Hibbard 153. Excepted land under the 1841 Act was land reserved for
purposes such as schools, Indian reservations, public roads, and towns, and
land "actually settled and occupied for the purposes of trade and not agricul-
ture." Quite clearly the Act was meant to apply to open lands suitable for
agricultural uses. The Act applied not only to existing squatters but also to
individuals who "shall hereafter make a settlement in person on the public
lands to which Indian title had been at the time of such settlement extin-
guished." The requirements were that a settlement in person be made, that the
individual "inhabit and improve" the lands he settled, and that he "erect a
dwelling thereon." If this were done, he would be entitled, upon paying the
minimum price-then $1.25 per acre--"to enter with the register of the land
office for the district in which such land may lie up to 160 acres." This entry
with the land register recognized the settler as having received full title to the
land from the government, and a patent was issued so stating. For settlements
existing at the time of the passage of the Act, the settler wishing to purchase
under its terms would have to file with the land register in the district, within
three months of the Act's passage, "a written statement, describing the land
settled upon, and declaring the intention of such person to claim the same under
the provisions of this Act." Within twelve months of the passage, he had to
make the requisite proof of settlement and improvement, make a required sworn
statement, and pay the full price. For settlements begun after the promulgation
of the Act, the filing was to be within thirty days of the settlement date, and
the payment and proof within twelve months of it.
Among the limitations stated in the Act were provisions that no person
could obtain more than one preemption right under the Act, nor could a person
owning 320 acres of any other land or one who abandoned residence on his own
land to reside on public land in the same state or territory, acquire any such
preemption right. Furthermore, a person would not be allowed to enter lands
with the register until he swore an oath before the land register officials that
he was not in violation of the above limitations, that he had not settled upon
and improved the land in order to sell it on speculation, that he had settled "in
good faith to appropriate [the land] to his or her own exclusive use or benefit,"
and that he had made no prior agreements that the title he would get from the
government would inure to the benefit of anyone other than himself. False
swearing in this was punishable as perjury, and the false swearer would forfeit
any money paid for the land, and any conveyance he may have made of the land
would be null and void, unless it were to a bona fide purchaser.
75 Robbins 89.
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these three principles are relatively clear and need no elaboration
here; their relevance to current squatter settlements would also
seem to be clear. Fourth, "settlers [would] be protected from all
intrusion and allowed a reasonable time to earn or gather together
a sum sufficient to buy the land." This fourth principle refers to
the period of grace between the settler's filing of his intention to
purchase under the Act and the date by which he must make proof
and payment; during that period no other purchaser could enter
and begin a preemption claim of his own.
One must consider the wisdom and practical effects of this act,
as well as its relevance to the solution of modern squatters prob-
lems. It should be emphasized that the idea of the Act was to
allow actual settlers on government land to gain ownership of such
land at low cost and without having to compete with other pur-
chasers, especially those who would buy for speculative purposes.
The auction system of land sales, which had been the primary means
of gaining ownership of government land before the preemption
laws were begun, had been shown to work to the advantage of
speculators who could afford to pay more for the land than could
the squatters.76 Preemption would now hold from the market and
out of the auctions, land on which settlers had filed their intentions
of purchasing at the minimum price after establishing the required
uses. This approach, for the purpose of curbing speculation in
government land sales while affording secure rights to existing
settlements and encouraging future settlements, was basically
sound and workable ;77 it would seem to have much to offer for this
same purpose in modern squatter colonies on government land even
in urban areas.
One essential feature of a modern statute similar to the Pre-
emption Act would be that the use requirements be specific enough
to be enforceable effectively. The vagueness of the terms in the
1841 Act--"settlement," "inhabit," and "improve"-probably was
a factor which contributed to the somewhat tarnished, though
one would not say unsuccessful, history of the government's pro-
grams for promoting settlement rather than speculation. Since
speculation in land was at least as likely to occur in a rural area in
the nineteenth century as it is in an urban area in the twentieth
century, the more precise the use requirements for the granting
of preemption rights, the greater the chances of affording secure
rights to the land to squatters. The Preemption Act requirement
that a "dwelling" be erected was a step in the direction of specific-
76 A. Bertrand and F. Corty, supra note 72, at 49-50; Robbins 9.
77 "[T]he preemption laws and later the homestead laws succeeded in the
main in putting land into the hands of farmers rather than of land jobbers."
Hibbard 225.
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ity, but more could have been done in the Act and more should be
done in modern legislation.78
One of the most interesting features of the Preemption Act
was that it affected both existing squatters and potential squat-
ters-that is, persons likely to become squatters in the absence
of appropriate alternatives for settlement.79 It is not clear that this
feature would be of great value in a modern urban area. The pre-
emption approach would seem more useful for giving rights to
existing squatters on government land. It might even be suggested
that where squatters are on private property in great numbers,
and there are good reasons for allowing them to stay there, the
government could consider the stabilization of legal rights a valid
public purpose, and the private land could be officially expropriated
for this purpose with fair compensation arranged for the owners.
The government then could institute retrospective preemption
measures to accord ownership rights to the squatters. A statute
with prospective preemption effects, however, would be useful in
an urban setting only if areas were specified which would be open
to preemption claims on suitable sizes of lots for appropriate uses.
This would also be true for a prospective, urban plan analogous to
the Homestead Act; such a plan is discussed below.
The 1841 Act applied only to surveyed land. In 1862, however,
it was extended to unsurveyed land as well to protect squatters
in areas the surveyors had not reached. 0 One observer has sug-
gested that this extension should have had the effect of curbing
speculation, inasmuch as the bounds of claims on unsurveyed land
could be delineated only by evidence of actual possession, rather
than by reliance on the plots as marked out by surveys. 81 Re-
gardless of this effect, the need for surveying in the operation of
a preemption policy would seem to be great in urban areas. It
is important so that some order can be engendered and maintained
in urban areas and so that supplementary programs for improving
squatter colonies may be administered most easily. At the least,
there must be some record of the dimensions and locations of dif-
ferent persons' holdings, as well as the declaration of a maximum
size, even if only an approximate one, for individual lots on which
preemption rights may be attained. The use of local land registers,
as well as a central listing, would seem to be one aspect of the
78 The 1830 Act had required that the land be "cultivated," but this was not
included in 1841.
79 The preemption provisions of the Act of 1841 repudiated the retro-
spective policy of preemption and recognized that settlement prior to
purchase was no longer per se a trespass. The act provided that an
individual, henceforth, could legally venture forth upon public sur-
veyed land and stake a claim to the exclusion of all others.
Robbins 89.
80 Act of June 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 413.
81 Hibbard 167.
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United States preemption program worthy of consideration else-
where.82
Another area of concern about the merits of the Act is that it
gave the preemptor a complete, fee simple title. The preemptor
did, of course, have to swear that he did not purchase with the
intention of selling for speculation or of turning over the benefits
of the title to someone else. But once he got title, he could in
fact sell it whenever and however he wished; it probably would
have been a very difficult matter for the land office to prove that
he had had the intention all along of speculating. Furthermore, the
local land officials probably did not have the time-or perhaps in
some instances a sufficient interest in the efficient, impartial ad-
ministration of the Act-to seek to impose the penalties provided
for in the Act in the many cases in which doubtful motives on the
part of the settler did exist. Apart from the problems of squatter
speculators,83 even honest settlers, those who had hoped to make a
claim and stick with it, were likely to succumb to speculators when
the going was rough. It had early been advocated that restrictions
be placed on the titles obtained under United States public land pro-
grams, but neither the Preemption Act nor the Homestead Act
"went so far as limiting the settler's right to dispose of the land he
received after it was patented." 84 There were restrictions on the
transferability of claims filed but not yet perfected into titles, and
these were probably worthwhile provisions. 5 But after the patents
were given, speculators were able to secure large quantities of land
second-hand, from the preemptors and homesteaders. This is an
effect which should be carefully restricted in the clarification of
squatters' rights, as some experts have already suggested.86 If
restrictions are really to have some significance, however, there
82 Allowance should be made, also, for the possibility of some sort of de-
ferred payment of the purchase price. Even though the Preemption Act allowed
the settler approximately one year in which to pay the price, he still had to
pay it as a lump sum. This may have been suitable for frontiersmen's earning
power, but it should be carefully considered in modern, urban situations-espe-
cially where there is substantial unemployment.
83 See Hibbard 211-19.
84 Sakolskd, supra note 18, at 178.
85 Act of May 29, 1830, § 3, 4 Stat. 420; Act of September 4, 1841, § 12, 5
Stat. 453.
86 Where speculation in squatments is anticipated, the terms of sale may
also include provisions against resale within a prescribed period or,
in the alternative, repayment in full of the public outlays. These
terms will vary with the country and the situation, but terms should
in all cases be realistic, not overharsh or arbitrary. Some profits can
be expected to be made by squatters, either through sublettings or
resales, and a few agreements cannot hope to prevent this altogether
or protect against all possible evasions.
Abrams, Squatter Settlements 13-14. Abrams also here suggests use of leases
with the right to purchase upon completion of a dwelling or upon continued
occupancy for a specified period. Discussion of use of conditional grants of land
by the states may be found in Hilliard at 369.
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must be efficient, honest, flexible but forceful administration of
the legislation.
The Homestead Act
Since mention has been made here of the Homestead Act of
1862,87 let us take a closer look at it. The Act provided that any
person, such as those individuals mentioned in the Preemption Act,
was entitled to enter up to 160 acres of unappropriated, surveyed
public land subject to preemption. Application to the local land
office for permission to make the entry had to be filed, accompanied
by payment of a small filing fee and by an affidavit stating the
application was being made for the applicant's own benefit, actual
settlement and cultivation, etc. Five years after this filing, but
not more than seven years after it, proof of five years residence
and cultivation beginning at the time of filing could be presented,
along with an affidavit stating that no part of the land had been
alienated; the register would then give the homesteader the patent
free of charge. If the settler had abandoned the land for more
than six months during the five year period, the land would revert
to the government. The Act allowed the settler the option of buy-
ing at the minimum price under the terms of the preemption acts
before the five year period had passed; this was generally known
as the "commutation" privilege.
Charles Abrams has written, "the primary aim of homesteading
policy has been to settle populations on vacant territory."88 This
clearly was a central purpose of the 1862 Act. Abrams also points
out that homesteading policy can reduce poverty, allay discontent
in populated centers, and better distribute surplus population.
Since these and similar purposes are fully applicable to contem-
porary urban areas and their squatter colonies, Abrams believes
squatter resettlement programs can appropriately be called "urban
homesteading."' 9 If this phrase assumes that such resettlement
programs might be aided by careful consideration of the United
States homesteading experience, it would seem to be particularly
apt.
We have already examined a number of the main features and
problems of the homesteading policy in regard to the preemption
act. Homesteading is, of course, a prospective policy; thus in an
urban area we must know quite clearly which areas we want to
make available for regulated settlement. The speculation problem,
as we have seen, is probably the largest problem. The Homestead
87 12 Stat. 392.
88 Abrams, Squatter Settlements 6.
89 Id. at 7.
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Act did not restrict alienability of title in any way, although it
did make the useful innovation of stating that no lands acquired
under it could ever be held liable for the payment of debts contrac-
ted before the patent was issued. Since this provision appears to
reduce the dependence on overall solvency by the settler in order
to maintain his holding, it is probably a valuable tool in a program
aiming at greater certainty and security of rights for squatters.
Two other aspects of the Homestead Act remain for considera-
tion. First, it is questionable that an urban homesteading policy
should grant land essentially free of charge as was done in this
country's homesteading. Since we are not promoting a settlement
policy in the sense in which the Homestead Act sought to "people
the wilderness"-although that is something a number of countries
might usefully consider-it would seem that if urban settlers are
able to pay reasonable amounts for their land, they should do so.
To the extent that private land is expropriated toallow areas to be
opened for settlement, the sales price from the new occupants could
be applied by the government to the compensation awarded to the
original owners. The effects of payment for the land on the
settler's attitude toward his stake in it and his inclination to make
good use of it are impossible to calculate; yet positive effects are
quite likely. 0
Another matter examined in the preemption discussion was the
specificity of the use requirements. If urban homesteading is to
produce reasonably well-planned, orderly communities, it must be
much more specific in its use requirements than the United States
homestead laws were or probably ever had to be.9 1
As a final point regarding the Homestead Act, we should con-
sider the controversy over the commutation privilege provision.92
Its supporters contended that it provided an escape route for the
settler who, because of some misfortune, could not continue to work
the land but still wanted to buy it outright at the minimum price.
Its critics argued that it encouraged speculation, as "settlers"
would get title early and then sell out if land prices were rising.
This dispute was never finally resolved, and commutation remained
possible even under the subsequent homestead acts passed in the
early years of this century.9 3 If fair and realistic restrictions on
DO For a good example of a detailed outline of the essentials of a squatter
resettlement program, see Abrams, Man's Struggle 232-35.
91 Supra notes 10-11.
92 See Hibbard 386-89; Sakolski, supra note 18, at 136.
93 Robbins 375. To conclude discussion of the relevant federal legislation,
one should note that there are other statutes which we have not touched upon
which do relate to squatters in this country. The federal preemption laws were
repealed by the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1097. Other homestead acts were
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alienation are provided in a modern homestead-type statute, a
commutation privilege could serve as a useful escape hatch without
fostering speculation and engrossment of land.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed the major elements of United States law
relating to squatters and have seen many of its weak points and
strong points. Drawing on the United States experience, sugges-
tions have been made for legislation of two sorts which might be
formulated to assist in the solution of the developing nations' large
squatter problems.
The federal Preemption Act has suggested the first type of
enactment, a direct and large scale approach to the securing of
rights for squatters on public land and on private land subject to
expropriation. The Homestead Act also has indicated the sorts of
legislative provisions which could be used in a coordinated effort
to make available for potential squatters new areas for orderly
settlement with secure legal rights. Measures such as these might
well have a direct, immediate, broad, and beneficial impact on the
squatter problems the developing countries now face.
The second type of legislation we have analyzed is the adverse
possession statute. This, as we have seen, is probably most useful
as an on-going measure for the adjustment and clarification of
ownership interests once programs of the more direct type have
brought about the major regularization of squatter status at which
we are aiming.
It should not be thought that we are assuming or suggesting
that United States law on squatters has all the solutions for the
squatter problems of today. The hope is, rather, that where this
country's experiences can shed light on the ways in which the law
can be improved to meet the needs of a nation's growing popula-
tion, those experiences will be given heed. We have pointed out
here some particular aspects of United States law which do seem
passed after 1862, and at present the homestead laws remain in force, only
applicable to limited, remaining areas of public land, as 43 U.S.C. 161 et seq.
(1964). The Townsites Act of 1844, 5 Stat. 657, gave towns preemption rights
similar to those which individuals had under the 1841 Act. The Graduation Act
of 1854, 10 Stat. 574, provided for graduation of land prices, allowing lowering
of prices on less desirable land. The Color of Title Act 43 U.S.C. 1068-1068b
(1964), is a limited, color of title, twenty year, adverse possession statute allow-
ing the acquisition of title on government lands by adverse possession.
The statutes we have examined in detail were the basic tools the government
used to deal with squatters and would-be squatters. There were numerous,
related statutes, some at the state level, passed both before and after the acts
discussed here; they were either forerunners of the major acts or were minor
modifications of them.
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to shed useful light; our experience encompasses sound and sensible
legal measures, as well as short-sighted and ineffective ones. As
law in the United States, often drawing on its foreign antecedents,
has been adjusted slowly and sometimes painfully to serve as an
instrument of social order and progress, so may the law of the
developing countries adapt to meet the pressing challenges of mod-
em times-challenges such as the squatters.
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